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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court to hear this appeal
pursuant to Article VIII, §4 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah, and §78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) , and Rule 3(a) ,
Supreme Court Rules.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES REVIEWED
A. Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
B.

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1.

C.

Utah Constitution, Article I, §2.

D.

Utah Constitution, Article I, §11.

E.

Utah Constitution, Article I, §24.
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Utah Constitution, Article VI, §23.
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Utah Constitution, Article VI, §26.

H.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendants, Jerry Cutshaw, individually and dba Interiors
Contracting ("Cutshaw") and Max J. Smith and Max J. Smith and
Associates, Inc. ("Smith"), essentially agree with the Statement
of the Case as outlined by Plaintiff, Paul Lichtefeld ("Lichtefeld"),

on pages 1 through

However, Cutshaw
Lichtefeld

of what

Lichtefeld"s Brief.

3 of his Brief.

and Smith

has been

except

designated

to the inclusion by
as

"Addendum

I18 in

Addendum 1 is a report by a structural
1

engineer commissioned by Lichtefeld to survey and assess damage to
the structure in question•

The lower Court based its dismissal of

Lichtefeld's action strictly upon the legal aspects of the case.
While the report in question was attached to an affidavit as an
exhibit

in the District Court proceeding, and therefore was

included as part of the Record, there has been no determination by
the District Court as to the evidentiary weight this report should
be given, if any.

Therefore, Cutshaw and Smith request that this

Court disregard any reference to Addendum I in Lichtefeldfs Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Section
(hereafter

78-12-25.5,

Utah

Code

§78-12-25.5")

does

not

provisions of either the United
Constitution.

Ann.

(1953

violate

as

equal

amended)
protection

States Constitution or the Utah

Cutshaw and Smith contend that §78-12-25.5 is

reasonably enacted by the Legislature, and those persons protected
under the statute
those who fall
Section

constitute a class, separate and distinct from

outside the protection of the statute.

§78-12-25.5

does

not violate

the

open

courts

provision of the Utah Constitution, (Article I, §11 and Article
XVI, §5), and the provisions of the statute

do not violate the

Utah Constitution, Article VI, §26, which forbids special laws or
legislation.

2

Those granted immunity from suit (architects, contractors,
surveyors and
them to

engineers) constitute a separate class, entitling

immunity as defined in §78-12-25.5. Although Lichtefeld

relies heavily on Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 769 (Utah
1985), declaring unconstitutional Utah's Product Liability Act, in
support of his argument that §78-12-25.5 be declared unconstitutional,

Cutshaw

and

Smith

assert

that

there

are

great

dissimilarities between the two acts,

which warrant this Court

distinguishing

v.

its

ruling

in

Berry

Beech

Aircraft

from

application in the instant case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT SECTION
78-12-25.5, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953 AS AMENDED)
IS REASONABLY ENACTED BY THE UTAH LEGISLATURE,
AND THUS DOES NOT DEPRIVE LICHTEFELD OF EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS UNDER ARTICLE I, §§2 AND
24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION OR THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Lichtefeld cites both Article I, §§2 and 24 of the Utah Constitution and §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Constitution which guarantee individuals
system and equal protection of laws,

of the United States

access to the judicial

claiming that §78-12-25.5

deprives him of these guaranties.
Article X, §24 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows:

3

"All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation,"
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits states from enacting laws that deny persons within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.
Although

the

language

of

the

Utah

State

and

federal

constitutional provisions are dissimilar, the Utah Supreme Court
has ruled that the provisions of the State Constitution embody the
same general principles as the federal constitution, to-wit:
Persons

similarly

situated

should

be treated

similarly; and

persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if
their circumstances were the same.

See, Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d

661, 669 (Utah 1984); Baker v. Matheson. 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979).
The Utah court has determined that whether a statute

meets

equal protection standards depends in the first instance upon the
objectives

of

the

statute

and

whether

the

classifications

established provide a reasonable basis for promoting
objectives.

those

See, Malan v. Lewis, supra, at 669.

Lichtefeld, although pressing this Court to adopt a higher
standard of review of §78-12-25.5, admits in his argument that the
appropriate standard of review to be applied by the Supreme Court
is the "rationality test" or "rational basis test."

Lichtefeld

cites no case law which supports his argument that, absent "suspect

4

classification," a higher standard of review by this
apply in this instance.

(See, Appellate Brief, pp.

Court would
10-11.)

Lichtefeld's reliance upon Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190, 97
S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d. 397 (1976) in support of his contention
that a higher level of review should be applied by this Court in
this case is misplaced.

Craig v. Boren reaffirms the proposition

that matters involving purely economic matters are entitled only
to the mildest standard of review under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Craig v. Boren. at 207.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

recognized

that

when

the

constitutionality of a statute is questioned, there are certain
legal principles which must be observed in deciding the matter.
Foremost among these principles is the
presumption that a statute is constitutional
and every reasonable doubt must be resoLved in
its favor.
A statute should be held valid
unless there is a clear, complete and
unmistakable violation of some specific
provision of the constitution.
Simms v. Smith. 571 P.2d 586, 587 (Utah 1977).
The level of scrutiny this Court must adopt in determining the
constitutionality of §78-12-25.5, as noted above, is the "rational
basis" test.

Under the rational basis test, Lichtefeld must

demonstrate, in his attack upon the constitutionality

of the

statute, that the statute does not rest upon any reasonable basis,
but is essentially arbitrary.

Utah Public Employee's Asso. v.
5

State. 610 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1980). In Utah Public Employees1 Asso.,
the Utah Supreme Court approved the analysis of the principles
under the traditional rational basis test referred to in Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, Sup. Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed.2d
369 (1910).

The principles of the analysis as stated in Lindsley

are as follows:
1.

The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not take from the state the power to classify in the
adoption of policy laws, but admits of the exercise of
a wide-scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids
what is done only when it is without any reasonable
basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.

2.

The classification having some reasonable basis does not
offend against that clause merely because it is not made
with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it
results in some inequality.

3.

When the classification in such a law is called in
question, if any state of facts reasonably

can be

conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that
state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be
assumed.

6

4.

One who assails the classification of such a law must
carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon
any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.

In the case Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc.,
440, 20 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (1968), those principles as
enunciated in Utah Public Employees1 Asso. were reaffirmed.

See,

Trade Commission, at 962.
By its terms, §78-12-25.5, applies to all actions against the
class of persons —

architects, contractors, builders, surveyors,

engineers and inspectors —• who perform the
of designing, planning, supervision

of

specific activities
construction

construction of an improvement to real property.
activities relate to the process of

or the

These roles and

building a structure.

Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223, 224

(Utah 1974).

See,

The Utah

Legislature, by enacting §78-12-25.5 in 1967 focused on limiting
the periodic liability of persons whose activities relate to the
design, planning or construction of improvements to real property,
in contrast to the owners of real property and those who supply
materials and products utilized in making improvements thereon.
Section 78-12-25.5, as adopted by the Utah Legislature in 1967
provides:
78-12-25.5 Injury Due to Defective Design or
Construction of improvement to Real Property Within Seven Years.
7

No action to recover damages for any
injury to property, real or personal, or for
an injury to the person, or for bodily injury
or wrongful death, arising out of the defective
and unsafe condition of an improvement to real
property, nor any action for damages sustained
on account of such injury, shall be brought
against any person performing or furnishing the
design, planning, supervision of construction
or construction of such improvement to real
property more than seven years after the
completion of construction.
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual,
corporation, partnership, or any other legal
entity.
(2) "Completion of construction" for the
purposes of this act shall mean the date of
issuance of a certificate of substantial
completion by the owner, architect, engineer
or the agents, or the date of the owner's use
or possession of the improvement on real
property.
The limitation imposed by this provision
shall not apply to any person in actual
possession and control as owner, tenant or
otherwise,
of
the
improvement
of
such
improvement constitutes the proximate cause of
the injury for which it is proposed to bring
an action.
This provision shall not be construed as
extending or limiting the periods otherwise
prescribed by the laws of this state for the
bringing of any action.
In 1988 the Utah Legislature expanded the class protected by
the statute to include persons responsible for surveying property.
See,

§78-12-25.5

expansion

of the

(1988 revised
class by

statute)

the

8

(Addendum

Legislature, as

III).
well

as

This
its

clarification of ambiguities in the prior statute,
clearly the intent of the Legislature of the State
distinguish this group from those excluded by the

demonstrates
of Utah to

language of the

statute, such as materialmen, owners and occupants of the improved
property.
Courts in many other states have held that the distinction
made between these groups is reasonable and thus statutes of this
type do not violate equal protection nor the prohibition against
special legislation.

See, Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172,

455 SW.2 918 (1970), appeal dismissed 401 U.S. 901, 91 S.Ct. 868,
27 L.Ed.2d 800 (1971); Twin Falls Clinic and Hospital Building v.
Hamill, 644 P.2d 341 (Idaho 1982); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage
District No. 2, 366 So.2d 1381 (La. 1978); 01Brian v. Hazelet and
Erdal, 410 Mich. 1, 299 SW.2d 336 (1980);

Barnes v. J.W. Bateson

Co. , Inc, 755 SW.2d 518 (Tx App. 1988); Anderson v. Fred Wagner and
Roy Anderson, Jr.. Inc., 402 So.2d

320 (Miss. 1981); Reeves v.

Ille Electric Company. 170 Mont. 104,

551 P.2d

Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J.

647

(1976);

190, 293 A.2d 662

(1972); Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d

203

(1971);

Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 Ac2d
715 (1978); Harmon v. Angus R. Jessop Associates, Inc., 619 SWc2
522, 524 (Tenn. 1981); Yakima Fruit and Cold Storage v. Central
Heating and Plumbing Company, 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972).
9

As noted above, statutes similar to the one at hand have been
reviewed by courts of other jurisdictions, and
rejected on equal protection grounds.

constitutionally

For example, in Klein v.

Catalano, 437 N.E.2d. 514 (Mass. 1982), the

Supreme Court of

Massachusetts upheld its six year statute of repose and rejected
the argument that the Massachusetts statute violated principles of
equal protection, among other things.
The Massachusetts court found a rational basis for

enacting

the statute, this basis being to eliminate stale claims and to
prevent claims from being brought where evidence was no

longer

available to either party.
The Massachusetts court noted that it may disagree with

the

philosophy of the legislature, but that the court was not in a
position to question it as long as there was a rational basis for
the enactment of the statute.

The court stated:

The legislature could reasonably conclude that
the statistical improbability of meritorious
claims after a certain length of time and the
inability of the courts to adjudicate stale
claims weigh more heavily than allowing the
adjudication of a few meritorious claims.
Klein, at 521, (fn. 11).
The Massachusetts court then stated that while in some cases
statutes of this nature may impose a great hardship on a plaintiff
who has suffered injury and who has a meritorious

10

claim, the

arguments as to hardship are appropriate for legislation and not
for court interpretation.

Klein, at 522.

The court therefore

upheld the equal protection attack on the constitutionality of the
statute on the basis that the classification was

reasonable.

In Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corporation. 655 P.2d 822, 827
(Colo. 1982), the Colorado Supreme Court held that a Colorado
statute similar to §78-12-25.5, constituted a legislative response
to a recent trend

in tort law which had extended

architect

liability, even after completion of the building and acceptance
by the owner, to third parties injured by construction and design
defects, but

with

whom

the

architect

or

contractor

had

no

contractual relationship. The Yarbro court determined that since:
Construction projects generally have expected
useful lives of many years or decades, the
possibilities for long-term liability for the
professional architect or design engineer [or
contractor] are enormous. Thus, as a matter
of policy, the [State of Colorado] has limited
the extended exposure to liability by barring
suits against architects [and contractors]
which are brought more than ten years after
substantial completion of the building.
Yarbro, at 827.
The Supreme Court of Oregon in the case of Josephs v. Burns,
491 P.2d 203 (Or. 1971), upheld its ten year statute of

repose,

in light of an attack that the statute was unconstitutional because
of a claim that the statute violated the "remedy

11

by due course of

law clause" of the Oregon constitution.

The

court rejected this

argument, concluding that the state constitution did not inhibit
the legislature from altering common

law rights.

In pertinent

part, the court stated:
It has always been considered a proper function
of legislatures to limit the availability of
causes of action by the use of statutes of
limitation so long as it is done for the
purpose of protecting a recognized public
interest. It is in the interest of the public
that there be a definite end to the possibility
of future litigation resulting from past
actions. It is a permissible constitutional
legislative function to balance the possibility
of outlawing legitimate claims against the
public need that at some definite time there
be an end to potential litigation.
Josephs, at 208.
The Utah Supreme Court has had the opportunity to examine the
constitutionality of §78-12-25.5

In Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d

223 (Utah 1974), the Utah court recognized that the seven year
limitation is applicable to an

owner or tenant in possession at

the time of the construction, or

to their successors, insofar as

the statute pertains to a cause

of action of the owner or person

in

possession

against

a

protected

contractors]; and that it is reasonable

class

[architects

and

that those in possession

or control of the realty should discover any fault in construction
within seven years.

Good, at 224.
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This Court's attention is also directed to Hooper Water
Improvement District v. Reeve, 642 P.2d 745 (Utah 1982).

In this

case, Justice Howe in a concurring opinion addresses the issue of
legislative intent in enacting §78-12-25.5. According to Justice
Howe:
This statute was enacted by the legislature in
1967 and is similar to special statutes of
limitation enacted in over thirty states. . .
Its obvious intent was to protect "persons
performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision of construction, or construction"
of improvements to real property
from
indefinite future liability. In that statute
the legislature picked seven years after the
completion of the construction as the period
of limitation.
* * *

Under these special statutes of limitations
actions are barred after the designated periods
have run irrespective of whether the cilleged
negligence of the professional has been
discovered, or should have been discovered, by
that date.
Hooper, at 747.
Justice Howe concluded his analysis of §78-12-25.5 by stating
In view of that determination made by the
legislature, there is no room for us by means
of judicial interpretation to hold . . . that
the statute of limitations should not run until
the negligence of the professional was
discovered, or could have been discovered, or
until his professional relationship with the
client was terminated.
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Hooper, at 747.1
It is apparent from the recent enlargement of the class
protected by §78-12-25.5 to include surveyors as part of
class, that the Utah Legislature has given due consideration

the
to

the protected class, weighing the interests of the protected class
against claims of owners of real property.

The Utah Legislature

has determined and this Court recognizes that the protected class
deserves the

limitations as set out in the statute, and that the

class protected by the statute constitutes a separate and distinct
class. As the Massachusetts court in Klein discussed, a rational
basis for protecting the class does exist. Klein, at 521. It is
not

within

the

appropriateness
instead leave

purview

of

this

Court

to

determine

the

of the statute in light of competing claims, but
that determination to legislation.

Josephs v. Burns,

See, also,

supra, at 208.

The Clear Weight of Judicial Authority Supports Cutshaw's and
Smith's Position that 78-12-15.5 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
Amended) Passes Constitutional Scrutiny

Lichtefeld urges that Turner Construction Company
v. Scales, 752 P.2d 467 (Ala. 1988), is controlling in
the instant case. In Turner, the Alaska Supreme Court,
in a demonstration of what may be termed as judicial
overreaching, determined that a statute similar to the
Utah statute in question was unconstitutional. The
Turner Court based its decision upon the potential
interest of joint tort feasors in obtaining contribution,
an issue not present in this case.
14

This Court has recognized that it will give deference to the
weight of judicial authority of other jurisdictions rulings on
similar statutes in making a determination as to the constitutionality of a statute. See, Malan v. Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661, at 675,
where this Court considered the weight of judicial authority with
respect to the constitutionality of the guest statute enacted by
the Utah State Legislature.
The number of states in which the highest state court has held
building immunity statutes to be constitutional is approximately
twice the number holding to the contrary.

(See Addendum I.)

At

least one commentator has found that a thorough reading of all the
cases demonstrates that the better reasoned opinions are to be
found from those courts upholding their respective state statutes.
See, Volk; Statutes of Repose for Improvements to Real Property:
Equal Protection Considerations. American Business Law Journal,
Volume 22, p. 343, 379 (1984).

These opinions hold that the

distinctions between those who are and are not included in the
statutes

of

protection

are

not

artificial

and

that

the

classification scheme is rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose.2
2

The best examples in this category are Yarbro v. Hilton
Hotels Corp.. 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1983); Mullis v.
Company Services, Inc., 250 Georgia 90, 296 S.E*2d 579
(1982); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage District No. 2, 366
S.2d 1381 (Louisiana 1978); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass*
15

Ten

state

statutes

builders1

respecting

and architects1

liability have been invalidated by the high courts of those states
on equal protection or mixed equal protection and due process
grounds.

(See Addendum II.)

These courts have generally made

rulings with the holding that they could see no valid distinction
between

the

architects,

engineers

and

protected and other potential defendants.

contractors

who

were

See, e.g. Broome v.

Truluck, 241 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1978), wherein it is stated:
Certainly such classification must fall if the
benefit [i.e. immunity] granted to them is
denied to others similarly situated.
As noted by Lichtefeld, many of the cases holding building
immunity statutes unconstitutional have relied heavily upon the
first case decided in this area, Skinner v. Anderson, 231 NE.2d
588 (1967), and generally quote from it extensively.
been

severely

inconsistent.

criticized

as

being

shallow

and

Skinner has
internally

In Harmon v. Angus R. Jessop Association, 619 SW.2d

522, 524 (Tenn. 1981), the Tennessee Supreme Court stated:
With deference to the Illinois Court [in
Skinner], and to the other courts which have
followed its holding, we do not find its
rationale persuasive... [T]here is a substantial
difference between landowners and tenants, who
are excepted from the provisions of the . . .
701, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982); O'Brien v. Hazelet & Eurdal,
410 Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336 (1980); Rosenberg v. Town of
North Burgen, 293 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1972); Freezer Storage,
Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1978).
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statutes . . . and those engaged in the
designing and erection of a building. The duty
of the landowner or tenant in possession . .
. is a continuing one, whereas the work of the
architect, designer or engineer ordinarily
cease with the completion of the building. Yet
without limitations such as those provided in
the subject statutes their exposure to tort
claims could expand into the very distant
future.
Harmon. at 524.
The constitutionality of builders1 and contractors1 statutes
of repose has been upheld, as noted above, in at least twice the
number of states that it has been declared unconstitutional *
Lichtefeld's reliance on Skinner v. Anderson, supra, therefore, is
not well taken.
These

jurisdictions

which

have

reviewed

and

upheld

the

respective statutes of repose of the many states have set forth the
reasoning

behind

the upholding

the

constitutionality

of the

statutes, all of which focuses on one essential point, that is:
The class protected by the various statutes constitutes a separate
and distinct class from those who fall outside the statutes, and
therefore, deserve the protections of the statute.
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POINT II
THE LIMITATION ON ACTIONS EXPRESSED IN SECTION
78-12-25.5, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953 AS AMENDED)
IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND FULFILLS THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The enactment of statutes such as §78-12-25.5 is a response
from Legislatures of several states to mitigate a burden upon
construction

professionals

imposed

by

the

case

of

Inman v.

Binghamton Housing Authority, 143 NE.2d, 895 (N.Y. 1957).

In

Inman, the New York Court banned the privity doctrine, whereby an
architect or contractor was only liable to the building owner with
whom he contracted.
The Restatement of Torts published in 1965 recognized the rule
set out in Inman. as stated:
One who, on behalf of the possessor of land, erects a
structure or creates any other condition thereon is
subject to liability to others upon or outside of the
land for physical harm caused by dangerous character of
the structure or condition after his work has been
accepted by the possessor, under the same rules as those
determining liability of one who, as manufacturer or
independent contractor makes a chattel for the use of
others.
Prosser, Restatement of Torts §385 (West Publishing 1965).
The underlying rationale for the adoption of legislation such
as §78-12-25.5 is to avoid the difficulties of proof frequently
arising from the passage of time and to provide a measure of
security for professionals where such liability might extend to
18

retirement

of the individuals and in perpetuity against corporate

entities.

See, Yolk, p. 351. Forty-Five states and the District

of Columbia have enacted statutes designed to protect construction
professionals from
the date

liability after a certain number of years from

improvements to

Constitutional

real property have been completed.

challenges to these statutes have resulted in

twenty-nine state statutes being upheld as constitutional in their
respective states1 highest court. Ten jurisdictions have declared
these statutes unconstitutional.

(See Addenda I and II.)

Without the adoption of statutes such as §78-12-25.5, the
architects and contractors would have unlimited exposures for the
injuries sustained, even in an extreme situations.3
An interesting hypothetical was posed in the brief of
Amicus Curiae, Massachusetts State Association of
Architects, page 3, brief for Klein v. Catalano, 386
Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982).
Henry Hobson Richardson was a 19th Century
architect and builder in Boston Massachusetts.
He was engaged by Trinity Church in 1871 to
design and supervise the construction of a new
church in February, 1887; his architectural
firm survives to this day under the name of
"Shepley, Bullfinch, Richardson and Abbott".
. . In 1981 a communicant of the Trinity Church
trips on the church steps after a Christmas
service, to her great injury.
The lawyer
discovered that there are uneven risers which
doubtlessly contributed to his client's fall.
The client is understandably reluctant to sue
her own vestry; why not seek recovery from the
successor partnership, the designer of the
uneven risers. (As quoted in Voik, Statutes
19

The Utah Legislature and the legislatures of the majority of
other states and the District of Columbia have acted to mitigate
this burden imposed by the Inman rule on construction professionals
caused by the judicial termination of the privity doctrine.

See

Adair v. Koppes Company, 541 Fed. Supp. 1120, 1124 (ND Ohio 1982).
In adopting these statues, legislatures have attempted to strike
a

balance

between

the

public's

right

to

a

remedy

and

the

construction professionals' need for a temporal outer limit on tort
liability.
(1982).

See, Klein v. Catalano, Mass. 437 N.E.2d 514, 521

The reasons given by legislatures, including our own, in

justifying the adoption of this type of statute were to encourage
construction, to avoid the difficulties in proof that frequently
arise from passage of time, and to provide for a measure of
security for professionals where liability otherwise might extend
into

the

retirement

corporations.

of

individuals

and

in

perpetuity

for

See, Volk at page 351; Hooper Water Improvement,

supra, at 747.
Definitionally, §78-12-25.5 and similar statutes adopted by
other legislatures and the District of Columbia are not statutes

ZflT—Repose for Improvements to Real Property:
Equal Protection Consideration, Volume 22,
American Business Law Journal, pages 343-344
(1984) .)
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of limitation, they are statutes of repose.

As defined in

Restatement of Torts (2d), paragraph 899, comment G (1979) :
A statute of repose however, limits the time
within which an action may be brought and is
not related to the accrual of any cause of
action. The injury need not to have occurred,
much less have been discovered.
Lichtefeld argues that Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670
(Utah 1985), is controlling in his assertion that as a statute of
repose, §78-12-25.5 violates the Utah open courts provision.
The court in Berry conducted its analysis of Article I,
Section 11, of the Utah Constitution, and stated as follows:
Article I, Section 11 does not recede before
every legislative enactment, and neither may
it be applied in a mechanical fashion to strike
every statute with which there may be conflict.
To hold every statute of repose unconstitutional without regard to legislative purpose could
result in a legislative inability to cope with
widespread social or economic evils.
Berry, at 680.
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open and every person for
an injury done to him in person, property, or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course
law which shall be administered without denial
or unnecessary delay; no
person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party
The basis for consideration of whether or not the Utah
architects/builders statute of repose is constitutional was stated
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by Justice Zimmerman in the Matter of Criminal Investigation in the
Seventh District Court No. CS-1, March 31, 1988, 79 Utah Advance
Reports, page 5 wherein it is stated:
It is a well established rule that legislative
enactments
are
endowed
with
a
strong
presumption of validity and will not be
declared unconstitutional unless there is no
reasonable basis upon which they can be
construed as conforming to constitutional
requirements
•
•
.
[I]n
evaluating
constitutional
challenges to statutes, the
court
looks
to
"reasonable
or
actual
legislative purposes" rather than to "any
conceivable reason for the legislation . . .
and will construe statues to "effectuate the
legislative intent" while avoiding interpretations that will conflict with relevant
constitutional mandates.
(Citations omitted.)

See also, Utah Public Employees1 Asso.,

supra, p. 1273.
Our Supreme Court in the case of Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corporation, considered the product liability statute of repose
adopted by the Utah Legislature.
The Berry Court held that Section 11 of the Declaration of
Rights

and the prerogative of the legislature

are properly

accommodated by applying a two-part analysis.
First, Section 11 is satisfied if the law
provides an injured person an effective and
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course
of law," for vindication of his constitutional
interest.
The benefit provided by the
alternative remedy must be substantially equal
in value or other benefit to the remedy
abrogated in providing essentially comparable
22

substantive protection to ones
person,
property or reputation, although the form of
substituted remedy may be different.
Berry. at 680.
In the alternative as a second test to the constitutionality
of a statute of repose, Justice Stewart stated:
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy, abrogation of the remedy or cause
of action may be justified only if there is
clear social or economic evil to be eliminated
and the elimination of the existing legal
remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable
means for achieving the objective.
Berry. at 680.
a

)

Lichtefeld retains an alternative remedy against the original
owner of the structure,
Lichtefeld in this case has potential causes of action
against the prior owner of the structure and materialmen who
are not exempted from the operation of §78-12-25.5.
By adoption of the subject statute of repose the Utah
Legislature has determined it reasonable to engage in shifting
the risk of structural failure after the passage of seven
years from the substantial completion of the structure.
Apportioning such risks has been held to be a proper and
constitutionally

permissible

legislative

function.

See,

Salinero v. Pon, 124 Cal. App., 120 (1981); Anderson v. Fred
Waggoner and Roy Anderson, Jr. . Inc. , 402 S.2d 320, 322 (Miss.
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1981).

The effect of risk shifting is to make the owner or

other possessor of the property responsible for insurance
against loss and to thereby relieve the protected classes of
architects, engineers and contractors of the necessity of
securing insurance which could cover contingent liabilities
for an indefinite period of time.

An owner or possessor of

the property has been viewed as the logical person upon whom
such insurance burden should fall because he is in the best
position to maintain the premises.

See, Pacific Indemnity

Company v. Thompson Yeager, Inc., 260 NW.2d 555, 562 (Minn.
1977); Harmon v. Angus R. Jessop Assoc, Inc., 619 SW.2d 522
(Tenn. 1981).
b)

Section 78-12-25.5 obviates a clear economic evil.
The obvious economic evil that pervades without the
statute of repose as adopted by the Utah Legislature is that
architects/builders will be exposed for time immemorium to an
unlimited class of plaintiffs, including the owner, occupier
or unauthorized trespasser.

See, Twin Falls Clinic and

Hospital Building Corp. v. Hammil, 644 P.2d 341, 351 (Id.
1982).

In addition, the architect/builder liability may be

founded on negligence, warranty, contract or even strict
liability theories without the statute of repose. See, Abner
v.

Longridge

Estates, 272
24

Cal. App.

607

(1969).

The

justification for not extending the protection of this statute
to owners and shifting the burden to the owner after the
passage of seven years has been held to be a irational function
of the legislature to place different time limits on the
liability

of builders

from

those

placed

on

persons

in

possession or control of the property, such as the owner,
tenant or otherwise.

See, Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514

(Mass. 1982).
As noted above, there is a divergence of opinion among the
various state courts as to the constitutionality of the statutes
of repose for architects and contractors. Clearly the majority of
the opinions, (and, it is submitted the more rational and logical
opinions) favor the constitutionality of such statutes consistent
with the tests as enunciated in Berry.

Cutshaw and Smith have

demonstrated to this Court that there are alternative remedies
available to Lichtefeld in this case as contemplated in Berry and
consistent with the provisions of Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah
State Constitution.
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POINT III
THE TITLE TO THE STATUTE (§78-12-25.5, UTAH
CODE ANN.
(1953 AS AMENDED) ADEQUATELY
EXPRESSES THE CONTENT OP THE STATUTE, AND
THEREFORE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION OP
THE STATE OP UTAH.
Lichtefeld contends that §78-12-25.5 is violative of Article
VI, §22 of the Constitution of the State

of Utah, which reads in

pertinent part as follows:
... [N]o bills shall be passed containing more
than one subject, which shall be clearly
expressed in its title.
Lichtefeld argues that the title "Injury Due to Defective Design
or Construction of Improvement to Real Property - Within Seven
Years," does not advise members of the legislature or the public
that it is not a statute of limitations.

Lichtefeld claims that

because of this alleged defect in the statute, the statute does
not past constitutional muster.
Lichtefeld cites cases he claims supportive of his position.
However,

not

proposition.

one

of

the

cases

cited

Lichtefeld!s

support

In fact, one case cited by Lichtefeld supports the

proposition that the title of §78-12-25.5 is
permissibly related to the subject of the statute.

reasonably and
This Court in

State v. Twitchell. 333 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1959), wrote
title does not have to be an index to the act.

that, "The

All

that is

required is that the subject matter of the act be reasonably
26

related to the title and that all parts of the act be
related to each other."

reasonably

Twitchell, at 1078.

The Utah Supreme Court in a case more current than

those

presented by Lichtefeld has inquired as to the fair notice content
of the title of a statute.

In its opinion

in McGuire v.

University of Utah Medical Center. 603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979), this
Court addressed
titles.

legislative requirements with respect to drafting

This court stated as follows:
The legislature would be required to draft
titles with as much care as they must expend
on the substance of the laws passed, and if
they did not, legislative enactments would
constantly be attacked in the courts. The
legislature should not be burdened with an
overly rigid interpretation of a basically
salubrious constitutional principle, cind the
law does not so require. Obviously, a fair
synopsis serves the useful purpose of alerting
legislators to the content of a bill, especially in a legislature with limited staff
personnel, but fair notice of the content of
a bill is all that is constitutionally
required.

McGuire, at 789.
Lichtefeld then asserts that a no-action statute is not
statute of limitations which, Lichtefeld
statute unconstitutional.

a

claims, renders the

Because the title to the Act refers to

"limitation on actions," Lichtefeld concludes that the title fails
to give reasonable notice of the statute's subject matter.
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Interpreting a statute similar to §78-12-25.5,
court has held that a no-action provision
limitation on actions that may be brought.

a New Mexico

literally

is a

The reference in

the

title to "limitation on actions" logically and naturally

connects

with the no-action provision of the statute.

provides

The title

reasonable notice therefor of the subject matter and

does not

violate the constitution. See, Howell v. Burke, 568 P.2d 214, 218
(N.M.Ct.App. 1977). See also, Cheney v. Smith, 108 Idaho 209, 697
P.2d 1223 (Id.App. 1985); State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d
1984) .

197 (Wash.

The Supreme Court of Washington has determined that the

test of sufficiency of a title to an act is whether it provides
sufficient notice to lead an interested person to inquire into the
bill's contents.

State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197 (Wash. 1984).

The

title of the Utah statute of repose meets those conditions as set
forth above, and therefore passes constitutional scrutiny.
POINT IV
SECTION 78-12-25.5, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953 AS
AMENDED), IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A SPECIAL
LAW OR LEGISLATION.
Lichtefeld

argues that §78-12-25.5

is violative

of

Article VI, §26 of the Utah Constitution which states: "No private
or special law shall be enacted where a general law
applicable."
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can be

Lichtefeld cites as controlling the Wyoming case of Phillips
v, ABC Builders. Inc.. 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980).

In Phillips, the

court held that a similar Wyoming statute was a

special law, at

least to the extent that no special law can be

enacted where a

general one may be made applicable.
Regarding special

legislation, the general rule is that

although the legislature may classify and enact statutes, there
must

be

a

reasonable

basis

to

support

special

legislation

classification of a statute. If there is a distinguishing factor,
the
some

legislature may properly adopt the classification, even if
inequality may result.

See, Twin Falls Clinic and Hospital

Building v. Hamill. 644 P.2d 341, 348 (Idaho 1982); Yarbro v.
Hilton Hotels Corporation. 655 P.2d 822, 829 (Colo. 1982).

In

cases involving claims of special legislation, the burden is on
the appellant to demonstrate that any classification is arbitrary
and

unreasonable.

unarbitrary

It

follows

classification

then

that

upon

substantial

based

a

reasonable

and

differences

which relate to the public purpose is not precluded by this constitutional provision.

See, Hale v. City and County of Denver, 441

P.2d 332 (Colo. 1966); Yarbro, supra, at 828.
As set out in preceding arguments, Cutshaw and Smith have
demonstrated to this Court that the Legislature of the State of
Utah

could

very

well

have,

and
29

did,

determine

§78-12-25.5

reasonable based upon the necessary protection to be afforded the
particular class covered by the statute.
The Supreme Courts of the States of Colorado, Arkansas
Montana, among

others, have

reviewed

this

issue

of

and

special

legislation pertaining to statutes similar to §78-12-25.5

In

Reeves v. Ille Electric Company, 551 P.2d 647 (Mont. 1976),

the

court

considered

§78-12-25.5,

the

violated

contention
due

that

process,

a

statute
was

similar

to

discriminatory,

contravening equal protection of the law, and was local and
special legislation and stated:
... [Materialmen and the owners of buildings
or structures who are in sole control of a
premises after completion of the work are not
similarly situated with [the protected class].
They are not in the same class with those
described in the act. Particularly is this
true after construction is substantially
completed and accepted by the owners. Part of
acceptance
is
to
accept
some
future
responsibility for the condition of the
premises. (Emphasis supplied by the court)
***

We have carefully considered Skinner v.
Anderson concerning this appeal.
In all
deference and respect to the decision of the
Supreme Court of Illinois, we cannot apply its
reasoning to this case. That court held the
Illinois statute, there challenged, to be
discriminatory
against
others
similarly
situated.
Further, a vital distinction,
nonetheless, exists between owners or suppliers
and those engaged in the professions and
occupations of design and building. This is
not arbitrary or unreasonable.
It is a
30

legitimate,
practical
legislative function.

exercise

of

the

Reeves v. Ille Electric Company, 551 P.2d 647 (Mont. 1976), citing
with approval Carter v. Hartenstein, 455 SW.2d 918, 920
(Ark.
1970), cert, denied 401 U.S. 901, 91 S.Ct. 868, 27 L.Ed.2d 800;
See also, Yarbro, supra, at 827.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has determined

that

the standard which governs whether legislative classifications are
rational is whether facts can be reasonably conceived

which would

justify distinctions or differences in state policy

as between

different persons.

Baker v. Matheson. 607 P.2d 233

(Utah 1979).

The Utah Legislature, as noted in previous argument, in 1988, saw
fit to expand the class protected by §78-12-25.5 to include
surveyors. By expanding the statute, the Utah Legislature, it can
be assumed, determined that surveyors legitimately fall within the
group of persons who
design the same.

supply improvements to real property or

This is

a rational classification and further

serves to bring home the point that those who are owners or
occupiers of an improvement to

real property, or suppliers of

material, are indeed a separate

and distinct class from those

protected under the statute.
Lichtefeld has made no showing to this Court by which
Court may rule that §78-12-25.5 is arbitrary and
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this

unreasonable.

POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT POUND THAT §78-12-25.5, UTAH
CODE ANN. (1953 AS AMENDED) IS PROPERLY A
LIMITATION, PREVENTING AN OWNER OR PERSON IN
ACTUAL POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY FROM
COMMENCING AN ACTION AGAINST ARCHITECTS OR
CONTRACTORS
Lichtefeld attempts to heap confusion upon the Court in his
assertion that §78-12-25.5 does not act as a limitation or apply
to any person in actual possession or control or the owner of the
property in question. In support his contention, Lichtefeld cites
to the court the last two paragraphs of §78-12.25.5. For the sake
of convenience, Cutshaw and Smith restate the excepting clause:
. . . the limitation imposed by this provision
shall not apply to any person in actual
possession and control as the owner, tenant or
otherwise, of the improvement at the time the
defective and unsafe condition of such
improvement constitutes the proximate cause of
the injury for which it is proposed to bring
an action.
Lichtefeld then claims that the excepting clause has not been
interpreted by the Courts of Utah.

Lichtefeldfs Brief, at 6.

In Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223

(Utah 1974), cited

liberally throughout Lichtefeld1s brief, this Court analyzed the
excepting provision contained in §78-12-25.5.

The plaintiffs in

Good argued, as does Lichtefeld in the present case, that the owner
of the property at the time of construction is not affected by the
seven-year limitation and may sue within the applicable limitation
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period after injury is occasioned and that his right to sue runs
with the land.

The Utah Supreme Court quickly discarded this

argument, stating as follows:
The exception in the statute makes inapplicable
the seven year limitation period against the
original owner, and it allows others to sue him
for his torts, if any, within the regular
statutes of limitations after the cause
accrues. TThe exception] prevents the owner
as well as all others from suing the designer,
planner, supervisor or contractor after seven
years from completion of the project.
(Emphasis added.)
Good, at 224-225.
The Court in Good went on to state that
we think that this interpretation makes more
sense than to allow the original owner the
right to sue after seven years but to deny a
stranger that right. This is especially true
since the owner or tenant in possession and
control is in a far better position to discover
the defect, if any there be, than the stranger.
Good, at 225.
Cutshaw and Smith submit to this Court that they do not know
of any other way to make the language interpreting §78-12.25.5 more
clear.

At the risk of being repetitive, the exception in the

statute is directed to the owner or person in control of the
property in question, and allows others who have been injured as
a result of the defective improvement to the real property to
maintain an action against the original owner or person in control
33

of the real property within the regular limitation periods which
may go into effect after the cause of action accrues.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Cutshaw and Smith request
this Court affirm the ruling of the lower Court, dismissing Cutshaw
and Smith from the instant action, said dismissal with prejudice.
DATED this

/f

day of October, 1988.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH

/U^^n^
Thomas R. Gri^le^
Attorneys for Respondent,
Jerry Cutshaw dba
Interiors Contracting
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY

A. Murphy
Attorneys for Respondents^
Ma^c^iLJ Smith and Max J. mith
& Associates, Inc.
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ADDENDUM I

ADDENDUM
STATUES CONSTITUTIONAL
AS OF SEPTEMBER 23, 1988
1.

Arkansas

(on equal protection basis).

See, Carter v.

Hartenstein. 455 S.W.2d 918 (Arkansas 1970).
2.

California (equal protection; due process basis).

See,

Regents of the University of California v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co. , 147 Cal. Rptr. 486, 581 P.2d 197 (California 1978).
Upheld in Salinero v. Pon, 177 Cal Rptr. 204, (Cal. App. 1981);
Barnhouse v. City of Pinole. 183 Cal Rptr. 881 (Cal App. 1982).
3.

Colorado (upheld on equal protection, due process, open

court provision basis). See, Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corporation,
655 P.2d 822 (Colorado 1983).
4.

Delaware (upheld on equal protection; open court basis).

See, Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson Construction Co.,
489 A.2d 413 (Delaware 1985).
5.

District of Columbia (upheld on equal protection basis).

See, Britt v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 632 F.Supp. 734 (D.D.C.
1986).
6.

Florida

(upheld on open court basis).

See, American

Liberty Insurance Co. v. West & Conyers, 491 S.2d 573 (Fla. App.
1986).

1

7.

Georgia (upheld under open court provisions).

See, Nelms

v. Georgian Manor Condominium Association. 321 S.E.2d 330 (Georgia
1984) .
8.

Idaho (upheld as it did not violate "remedy provision,"

federal and state equal protection laws or state constitution
provision prohibiting special laws). See, Twins Falls Hospital and
Clinic Building v. Hamill. 644 P.2d 341 (Idaho 1982).
9.

Illinois (statute revised; held constitutional on equal

protection special legislation basis).

See, Blackwood v. Rusk,

102 111. Dec. 447, 148 111. App. 3d 168, 500 N.E.2d (1986), appeal
allowed 106 111. Dec. 144, 113 111.2d 572, 505 N.E.2d 350.
10.

Indiana (upheld on basis of equal protection).

See,

Beecher v. White, 447 N.E.2d 622 (Indiana App. 1983).
11.

Louisiana (upheld on basis of equal protection, due

process, and right of access to courts).

See, Burmaster v. Gravity

Drainage District No. 2, 366 S.2d 1381 (Louisiana 1978).
12. Maryland (upheld on the basis the statute did not violate
equal protection, was not a special law, and did not violate remedy
provision of state constitution). See, Whiting-Turner Contracting
Co. v. Couoard. 499 A.2d 178 (Maryland 1985).
13.

Massachusetts (upheld on basis of equal protection, due

process and remedied by recourse of laws). See, Klein v. Catalano,
437 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1982).
2

14.
basis).

Michigan (upheld on equal protection and due process
See, O'Brien v. Hazlet & Erdal. 299 N.W.2d 336 (Mich.

1980).
15.

Minnesota

(upheld on basis of equal protection, due

process; remedy of injuries laws of state constitution).

See,

Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minnesota 1982).
16.

Mississippi (upheld on basis of access to court and as

special law). See, Anderson v. Fred Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr.,
Inc., 402 S.2d 320 (Mississippi 1981).
17.

New Jersey (upheld on basis of equal protection and due

process).

See, Rosenberg v. Town of North Burgen, 293 A. 2d 662

(N.J. 1972).
18.

New Mexico (upheld on basis of equal protection and due

process).

See, Howell v. Burk, 568 P.2d 214 (New Mexico App.

1977) .
19.

North Carolina (upheld on basis of equal protection and

open-court remedy). See, Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 302 S.E.2d
868 (North Carolina 1983).
20.

New York.

See, Sears & Roebuck Co. v. Enco Assoc, 43

NY.2d 389, 372 N.E.2d 555, 401 NY Supp.2 767 (1977).
21.
protection

Ohio
and

(held
due

constitutional

on

process).

See,

3

the

basis

Elizabeth

of

equal
Gamble

Decon Home Association v. Turner Construction Co,, 470 N.E.2d 950
(Ohio App. 1984).
22.

Oregon (upheld on the basis of open courts provision of

the Oregon constitution).

See, Josephs v. Burns, 491 P.2d 203

(Ore. 1971).
23.

Pennsylvania

(upheld

on the basis of

provision of Pennsylvania constitution).

open courts

See, Freezer Storage,

Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715 (Penn. 1978).
24.

Rhode Island

(upheld on the basis of open courts

provisions of the Rhode Island constitution).

See, Kennedy v.

Cumberland Engineering Co. . Inc., 471 A.2d 195 (Rhode Island 1984) .
25.

Tennessee (held constitutional under the open courts

provision of the Tennessee constitution).

See, Harmon v. Angus R.

Jessop Associates, Inc.. 619 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1981).
26.

Texas (held constitutional under due process of Texas

constitution).

See, Ellerbee v. Otis Elevator Co,, 618 S.W.2d 870

(Texas App. 1981).
27.

Virginia (held constitutional).

See, Comptroller v.

King. 232 S.E.2d 895 (Va. 1977).
28.

Washington (held constitutional under equal protection

provisions of Washington and U.S. constitutions).

See, Yakima

Fruit and Cold Storage v. Central Heating and Plumbing Co. , 503
P.2d 108 (Wash. 1973).
4

29. Wisconsin (upheld on basis of due process).

See, United

States Fire Insurance Co. v. E.D. Wesley Co., 313 N.W.2d 883
(Wisconsin 1982).

cut.add
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ADDENDUM
STATUES UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AS OF SEPTEMBER 23, 1988
1.

Alaska

protection).

(held unconstitutional on the basis of equal

See, Turner Construction v. Scales, 752 P.2d 462

(Alaska 1988).
2. Alabama (held unconstitutional on basis that two subjects
were contained in one title; statute vague; open-court provision
of Alabama constitution).

See, Fort Jackson v. Manesman Demag

Corp., 435 S.2d 725 (Alabama 1983).
3. Florida (declared unconstitutional based upon open-courts
provision of the Florida constitution; due process). See, Overland
Construction Co. v. Sirmons, 369 S.2d 572 (Florida 1979).
4.

Hawaii (declared unconstitutional on equal protection

basis).

See, Shibuya v. Architects of Hawaii, Ltd., 627 P.2d 277

(Hawaii 1982).
5.

Kentucky

(declared unconstitutional on basis of due

process and special legislation). See, Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d
218 (Ky. 1973).
6.
basis) .

Nevada (declared unconstitutional on equal protection
See, State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. All Electric,

Inc., 660 P.2d 995 (Nevada 1983).

1

7.

New

Hampshire

protection basis).

(declared

unconstitutional

on

equal

See, Henderson Clay Products v. Edgar Wood and

Associates, 451 A.2d 174 (NH 1982).
8.

Oklahoma (declared unconstitutional on equal protection

basis).

See, Loyal Order of Moose Lodge 1985 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d

143 (Oklahoma 1977).
9.

South

Carolina

protection basis).

(declared

unconstitutional

on

equal

See, Broome v. Truluck, 241 S.E.2d 739 (S.C.

1978).
10.

Wyoming (declared unconstitutional on open court, equal

protection and special laws basis). See, Phillips v. ABC Builders,
Inc.. 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1981).

cut.ad2
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ADDENDUM III

78-12-25.5. Injury d u e to defective design or
construction of improvement to real
p r o p e r t y — Within seven years.
(1) (a) An action to recover damages for any injury
to property, real or personal, or for any injury to
the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death,
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition
of an improvement to real property, or any action
for damages sustained on account of the injury,
may not be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, surveying, supervising the construction of, or constructing the improvement to real property more than
seven years after the completion of construction.
(b) In an action regarding property boundary
surveys, the seven-year time period commences
when the property survey is either recorded in
the county recorder's office or filed in the county
surveyor's office under Section 17-23-17.
(2) The time limitation imposed by this section
does not apply to any person in actual possession and
control as owner, tenant, or otherwise, of the improvement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of the improvement constitutes the proximate
cause of the injury for which an action is brought.
(3) This section does not extend or limit the periods
otherwise prescribed by state law for the bringing of
any action.
(4) As used in this section:
(a) "Person" means an individual, corporation,
partnership, or other legal entity.
(b) "Completion of construction" means the
date of issuance of a certificate of substantial
completion by the owner, architect, engineer, or
other agent, or the date of the owner's use or
possession of the improvement on real property.
1988

ADDENDUM IV

78-12-25.5 Injury Due to Defective Design or Construction
of improvement to Real Property -Within Seven Years.
No action to recover damages for any injury to
property, real or personal, or for an injury to the
person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising
out of the defective and unsafe condition of an
improvement to real property, nor any action for damages
sustained on account of such injury, shall be brought
against any person performing or furnishing the design,
planning, supervision of construction or construction of
such improvement to real property more than seven years
after the completion of construction.
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, corporation,
partnership, or any other legal entity.
(2) "Completion of construction" for the purposes
of this act shall mean the date of issuance of a
certificate of substantial completion by the owner,
architect, engineer or the agents, or the date of the
owner's use or possession of the improvement on real
property.
The limitation imposed by this provision shall not
apply to any person in actual possession and control as
owner, tenant or otherwise, of the improvement of such
improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury
for which it is proposed to bring an action.
This provision shall not be construed as extending
or limiting the periods otherwise prescribed by the laws
of this state for the bringing of any action.

Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

ART. I, §2

CONSTITUTION OP UTAH

See. 2., [All political power inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments
are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit,
and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the public
welfare may require.

A R T . I, § 11

See. 11.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

[Courts open—Redress of injuries.]

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shall he barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.

ART. VI, § 23
CONSTITUTION OP UTAH
See. 23. [Bill to contain only one subject.]
Except general appropriation bills, and bills, for the codification and
general revision of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more than
one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ART. I, § 24

S e c 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

ART. VI, $ 26

CONSTITUTION OP UTAH

S e c 26. [Enumeration of private laws forbidden.]
The Legislature is prohibited from enacting any private or special laws
in the following cases:
1. Granting divorce.
2. Changing the names of persons or places, or constituting one person
the heir-at-law of another.
3. Locating or changing county scats.
4. Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of Justices of the Peace.
5. Punishing crimes and misdemeanors.
6. Regulating the practice of courts of justice.
7. Providing for a change of venue in civil or criminal actions.
8. Assessing and collecting taxes.
9. Regulating the interest on money.
10. Changing the law of descent or succession.
11. Regulating county and township affairs.
12. Incorporating cities, towns or villages; changing or amending the
charter of any city, town or village; laying out, opening, vacating or
altering town plats, highways, streets, wards, alleys or public grounds.
13. Providing for sale or mortgage of real estate belonging to minors
or others under disability.
14. Authorizing persons to keep ferries across streams within the State.
15. Remitting fines, penalties or forfeitures.
16. Granting to an individual, association or corporation any privilege,
immunity or franchise.
17. Providing for the management of common schools.
18. Creating, increasing or decreasing fees, percentages or allowances
of public officers during the term for which said officers are elected or
appointed.
The Legislature may repeal any existing special law relating to the
foregoing subdivisions.
In all cases where a general law can be applicable, no special law shall'
be enacted.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to deny or restrict the
power of the Legislature to establish and regulate the compensation and
fees of county and township officers; to establish and regulate the rates
of freight, nasaaflre. toll and chararea of railroads, loll roads, ditch, flume
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